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Executive Summary
Cyberspace has become a full-blown war zone as 
governments across the globe clash for digital 
supremacy in a new, mostly invisible theater of 
operations. Once limited to opportunistic criminals, 
cyber attacks are becoming a key weapon for 
governments seeking to defend national sovereignty 
and project national power. 
From strategic cyber espionage campaigns, such as 
Moonlight Maze and Titan Rain, to the destructive, 
such as military cyber strikes on Georgia and Iran, 
human and international conflicts are entering a new 
phase in their long histories. In this shadowy 
battlefield, victories are fought with bits instead of 
bullets, malware instead of militias, and botnets 
instead of bombs.
These covert assaults are largely unseen by the 
public. Unlike the wars of yesteryear, this cyber 
war produces no dramatic images of exploding 
warheads, crumbled buildings, or fleeing civilians. 
But the list of casualties—which already includes 
some of the biggest names in technology, financial 
services, defense, and government —is growing 
larger by the day. 
A cyber attack is best understood not as an end in 
itself, but as a potentially powerful means to a wide 
variety of political, military, and economic goals.  
“Serious cyber attacks are unlikely to be 
motiveless,” said Martin Libicki, Senior Scientist 
at RAND Corp. “Countries carry them out to 
achieve certain ends, which tend to reflect their 
broader strategic goals. The relationship 
between the means chosen and their goals will 
look rational and reasonable to them if not 
necessarily to us.”
Just as each country has a unique political 
system, history, and culture, state-sponsored 
attacks also have distinctive characteristics, 
which include everything from motivation to 
target to type of attack.
This report describes the unique characteristics of 
cyber attack campaigns waged by governments 
worldwide. We hope that, armed with this knowl-
edge, security professionals can better identify their 
attackers and tailor their defenses accordingly.
Here is a quick overview:
• Asia-Pacific. Home to large, bureaucratic 
hacker groups such as the “Comment Crew” 
who pursue many goals and targets in 
high-frequency, brute-force attacks.
• Russia/Eastern Europe. These cyber attacks 
are more technically advanced and highly 
effective at evading detection.
• Middle East. These hackers are dynamic, 
often using creativity, deception, and 
social engineering to trick users into com-
promising their own computers.
• United States. The most complex, targeted, 
and rigorously engineered cyber attack 
campaigns to date.
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Introduction
World War Z—a bestselling book and Holly-
wood movie—detailed a global pandemic in 
which politics and culture deeply influenced 
how the public—and by extension, govern-
ments—reacted to a zombie plague. In one 
passage, for example, an Arab boy refused to 
believe that the disease was real, suspecting 
that Israel had fabricated the story. The nations 
described in World War Z—the United States, 
China, Russia, South Korea, Israel, and many 
others—are involved in a very different type of 
conflict, but one with real and growing national 
security impact: World War C, where “C” 
stands for “Cyber”. However, the same rule 
applies: each country has a unique political 
system, history, language, culture, and under-
standing of human and international conflict.
Cyber conflict often mirrors traditional conflict. 
For example, China uses high-volume cyber 
attacks similar to how it used infantry during the 
Korean War. Many Chinese soldiers were sent 
into battle with only a handful of bullets. Given 
their strength in numbers, they were still able to 
achieve battlefield victories. On the other end of 
the spectrum lie Russia, the U.S., and Israel, whose 
cyber tactics are more surgical, reliant on 
advanced technologies and the cutting-edge work 
of contractors who are driven by competition and 
financial incentives.
We are still at the dawn of the Internet Age. But 
cyber attacks have already proven themselves as  
a low-cost, high-payoff way to defend national 
sovereignty and to project national power. Many 
of today’s headlines seem to be pulled from the 
pages of a science fiction novel. Code so sophisti-
cated it destroys a nuclear centrifuge thousands 
of miles away. Malware that secretly records 
everything a user does on a computer. A software 
program that steals data from any nearby device 
that has Bluetooth connectivity. Encrypted code 
that decrypts only on one specific, target device. 
Such sophistication speaks volumes about the 
maturity, size, and resources of the organizations 
behind these attacks. With a few rare exceptions, 
these attacks are now in the exclusive realm of 
nation-states.
“The international community has developed a 
solid understanding of cyber technology,” said 
Prof. Michael N. Schmitt of the U.S. Naval War 
College, in an email interview. “What is missing 
is a grasp of the geopolitical context in which 
such technology operates. Attribution determi-
nations made without sensitivity to the geopolit-
ical surroundings are seldom reasonable.”
World War C, like any analogy, has its limits. 
Cyber war has been compared to special 
operations forces, submarine warfare, missiles, 
assassins, nuclear weapons, Pearl Harbor, 9/11, 
Katrina, and more. Even our zombie analogy is 
not new. Often, any compromised computer, if 
it is actively under the surreptitious control of a 
cybercriminal, is called a zombie, and botnets 
are sometimes called zombie armies. Also, 
compared to stockpiling tanks and artillery, 
writing cyber attack code, and compromising 
thousands if not millions of computers, is easy. 
Moreover, malware often spreads with the 
exponential growth of an infectious disease.
This report examines many publicly known 
cyber attacks. By exploring some of the 
distinctive national or regional characteristics 
of these attacks, organizations can better 
identify their attackers, anticipate future 
attacks, and defend themselves.
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A Word of Warning
The analytical waters surrounding cyber warfare 
are inherently murky. At the strategic level,  
governments desire to have a degree of plausible 
deniability. At the tactical level, military and 
intelligence organizations envelop such opera-
tions in layers of classification and secrecy. To be 
effective, information operations rely on decep-
tion—and the Internet offers an ideal venue for   
a spy’s smoke and mirrors. In practical terms, 
hackers often run their attacks through cyber 
terrain  (such as compromised, third-party 
networks) that present investigators with 
technical and jurisdictional complications. And 
finally, cybercriminal tools, tactics, and proce-
dures (TTPs) evolve so quickly that cyber defense, 
legislation, and law enforcement remain behind 
the attacker’s curve.
“The biggest challenge to deterring, defending 
against, or retaliating for cyber attacks is the 
problem of correctly identifying the perpetrator,” 
said Prof. John Arquilla, Naval Postgraduate School 
in an email interview with FireEye.® “Ballistic 
missiles come with return addresses. But computer 
viruses, worms, and denial of service attacks often 
emanate from behind a veil of anonymity. The best 
chance to pierce this veil comes with the skillful 
blending of forensic back-hacking techniques with 
deep knowledge of others’ strategic cultures and 
their geopolitical aims.”
Cyber “attribution”—identifying a likely culprit, 
whether an individual, organization, or na-
tion-state—is notoriously difficult, especially for 
any single attack. States are often mistakenly 
identified as non-state actors, and vice versa. To 
make matters worse, ties between the two are 
increasing. First, a growing number of “patriotic 
cybercriminals” ostensibly wage cyber war on 
behalf of governments (examples include Chechnya 
and Kosovo in the 1990s, China in 2001, Estonia in 
2007, Georgia in 2008, and every year in the 
Middle East).1 Second, cybercrime organizations 
offer anyone, including governments, cyber attack 
services to include denial-of-service attacks and 
access to previously compromised networks.
FireEye researchers have even seen one 
nation-state develop and use a sophisticated 
Trojan, and later (after its own counter-Trojan 
defenses were in place) sell it to cybercriminals 
on the black market. Thus, some cyber attack 
campaigns may bear the hallmarks of both state 
and non-state actors, making positive attribution 
almost impossible. And finally, “false flag” cyber 
operations involve a hacker group behaving like 
another to mislead cyber defense researchers.
The FireEye Perspective
Within the shadowy world of cyber warfare, 
FireEye occupies a unique position. First, our threat 
protection platform has been installed on thou-
sands of sensitive networks around the world. This 
gives our researchers a global and embedded 
presence in the cyber domain. Second, FireEye 
devices are placed behind traditional security 
defenses such as firewalls, anti-virus, and intrusion 
prevention systems. This means that our “false 
positive” rate is extremely low, and that the attacks 
we detect have already succeeded in penetrating 
external network defenses.
1 Geers K. (2008) “Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare,” Hakin9 E-Book, 19(3) No. 6; SC Magazine (27 AUG 08) 1-12.
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Asia-Pacific
China—the elephant in the room
The People’s Republic of China is the noisiest 
threat actor in cyberspace. The reasons for this 
include  its huge population, a rapidly expanding 
economy, and a lack of good mitigation strategies 
on the part of its targets.
Chinese attacks on the U.S.
The list of successful Chinese compromises is 
long, and spans the entire globe. Here are some of 
the most significant incidents in the U.S.:
• Government: By 1999, the U.S. Department 
of Energy believed that China posed an “acute” 
threat to U.S. nuclear security via cyber 
espionage.2 By 2009, China apparently stole 
the plans for the most advanced U.S. fighter jet, 
the F-35.3.
• Technology: China hacked Google, Intel, 
Adobe, and RSA’s SecureID authentication 
technology—with which it then targeted 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and L-3 
Communications.4
• Business and Financial Services: Morgan 
Stanley, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and 
numerous banks have been hacked.5
• Media: The New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal, Washington Post, and more have 
been targeted by advanced, persistent cyber 
attacks emanating from China.6
• Critical Infrastructure: Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) reported in 2013 
that 23 gas pipeline companies were hacked 
(possibly for sabotage),7 and that Chinese 
hackers were seen at the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers’ National Inventory of Dams.8
Some of these cyber attacks have given China 
access to proprietary information such as 
research and development data. Others offer 
Chinese intelligence access to sensitive commu-
nications, from senior government officials to 
Chinese political dissidents.
2 Gerth, J. & Risen, J. (2 May 1999) “1998 Report Told of Lab Breaches and China Threat,” The New York Times.
3 Gorman, S., Cole, A. & Dreazen, Y. (21 Apr 2009) “Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project,” The Wall Street Journal.
4 Gross, M.J. (1 Sep 2011) “Enter the Cyber-dragon,” Vanity Fair.
5 Gorman, S. (21 Dec 2011) “China Hackers Hit U.S. Chamber,” Wall Street Journal; and Ibid.
6 Perlroth, N. (1 Feb 2013) “Washington Post Joins List of News Media Hacked by the Chinese,” and “Wall Street Journal Announces That It,  Too, Was Hacked 
by the Chinese,” The New York Times.
7 Clayton, M. (27 Feb 2013) “Exclusive: Cyberattack leaves natural gas pipelines vulnerable to sabotage,” The Christian Science Monitor. 
8 Gertz, B. (1 May 2013) “Dam! Sensitive Army database of U.S. dams compromised; Chinese hackers suspected,” The Washington Times.
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9 Warren, P. (18 Jan 2006) “Smash and grab, the hi-tech way,” The Guardian.
10 “Espionage Report: Merkel’s China Visit Marred by Hacking Allegations,” (27 Aug 2007) Spiegel.
11 Leppard, D. (31 Jan 2010) “China bugs and burgles Britain,” The Sunday Times.
12 Exclusive cyber threat-related discussions with FireEye researchers.
13 Pubby, M. (01 Jul 2012) “China hackers enter Navy computers, plant bug to extract sensitive data,” The Indian Express. 
14 Ungerleider, N. (19 Oct 2010) “South Korea’s Power Structure Hacked, Digital Trail Leads to China.” Fast Company.
15 Mick, J. (28 Jul 2011) “Chinese Hackers Score Heist of 35 Million South Koreans’ Personal Info,” Daily Tech.
16 McCurry, J. (20 Sep 2011) “Japan anxious over defence data as China denies hacking weapons maker,” The Guardian;  
Chinese attacks outside the U.S.
Of course, the U.S. is not China’s only cyber 
target. All traditional, geopolitical conflicts have 
moved into cyberspace, and Chinese 
compromises encompass the entire globe. But 
many contests have been one-sided affairs, with 
all publicly known attacks emanating from China.
• Europe: In 2006, Chinese cybercriminals 
targeted the UK House of Commons;9 in 
2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
raised the problem of nation-state hacking 
with China’s President;10 in 2010, British 
MI5 warned that undercover Chinese 
intelligence officers had given UK business 
executives malware-laden digital cameras 
and memory sticks.11
• India: Indian officials worry that China 
could disrupt their computer networks 
during a conflict. One expert confided 
that an exclusive reliance on Chinese 
hardware might give China a “permanent” 
denial-of-service capability.12 One 
sophisticated attack on an Indian Navy 
headquarters allegedly used a USB vector 
to bridge the “air-gap” between a 
compartmentalized, standalone network 
and the Internet.13
• South Korea: The South Korean 
government has complained for years of 
Chinese activity on its official computers, 
including a 2010 compromise of the 
personal computers and PDAs belonging 
to much of South Korea’s government 
power structure14 and a 2011 assault on an 
Internet portal that held personal 
information for 35 million Koreans.15.
• Japan: Here, the target list includes 
government, military, and high-tech 
networks. Chinese cybercriminals have 
even stolen classified documents.16.
CHINA
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17 Report: Plans for Australia spy HQ hacked by China », (28 mai 2013) Associated Press.
18 « Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network », (29 mars 2009) Information Warfare Monitor.
19 Vijayan, J. (18 novembre 2010) « Update: Report sounds alarm on China’s rerouting of U.S. Internet traffic », Computerworld.
20 Sanger, D., Barboza, D. et Perlroth, N. (18 février 2013) « Chinese Army Unit is seen as tied to Hacking against U.S. », The New York Times. 
21 Pidathala, V., Kindlund, D. et Haq, T. (1er février 2013) « Operation Beebus », FireEye.
• Australia: China allegedly stole the blueprints 
for the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization’s new $631 million building.17
• Worldwide: In 2009, Canadian researchers 
discovered that China controlled a world-
wide cyber espionage network in over 100 
countries.18 In 2010, a Chinese telecommu-
nications firm transmitted erroneous 
routing information for 37,000 computer 
networks, which misrouted some Internet 
traffic through China for 20 minutes. The 
attack exposed data from 8,000 U.S. 
networks, 1,100 Australian networks, and 
230 French networks.19
Chinese cyber tactics
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is home to 
1.35 billion people, or more than four times the 
population of the United States. Therefore, 
China often has the ability to overwhelm cyber 
defenses with quantity over quality, just as it did 
in the Korean War and as it might do in any other 
type of conflict.
The Chinese malware that FireEye researchers 
have analyzed is not the most advanced or 
creative.  But in many circumstances, it has 
been no less effective. China employs brute-
force attacks that are often the most inexpen-
sive way to accomplish its objectives. The 
attacks succeed due to the sheer volume of 
attacks, the prevalence and persistence of 
vulnerabilities in modern networks, and a 
seeming indifference on the part of the 
cybercriminals to being caught. 
Reconnaissance
Mailing Lists, Previous Watering Hole Intel, 
Crawling, Mining Social Networks
Weaponization
Masked EXEs to Appear Non-Executable File 
Formats, Malicious Non-EXE File Formats, 
Watering Hole Attacks
Delivery
Strategic Web Compromises, Spear phish URLs in 
Email, Weaponized Email Attachments, 
Webserver compromise via scanning
Exploitation
0-Day Browser / Application Vulnerabilities, 
Social Engineering
Installation
Feature Rich, Compact RATs with Minimal 
Evasion Capabilities (Requires Operator For 
Lateral Movement)
Command and  
Control (C2)
HTTP with Embedded, Standard Encodings (e.g., 
XOR), along with Custom Encodings
Actions on Objectives
Intelligence Gathering / Economic Espionage, 
Persistent Access
TTP Exemplars Comment Group
Table 1: Characteristics of Chinese cyber attacks
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20 Sanger, D., Barboza, D. & Perlroth, N. (18 Feb 2013) “Chinese Army Unit is seen as tied to Hacking against U.S.” The New York Times. 
21 Pidathala, V., Kindlund, D. & Haq, T. (1 Feb 2013) “Operation Beebus,” FireEye.
22 Riley, M. & Lawrence, D. (26 Jul 2012) “Hackers Linked to China’s Army Seen From EU to D.C.,” Bloomberg.
23 “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” Center for Strategic and International Studies.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Rapoza, K. (22 June 2013) “U.S. Hacked China Universities, Mobile Phones, Snowden Tells China Press,” Forbes.
27 Hille, K. (5 Jun 2013) “China claims ‘mountains of data’ on cyber attacks by US,” Financial Times.
The “Comment Crew,”20 a prominent exam-
ple of a Chinese cyber threat actor, is 
believed to be a contractor to the PRC 
government. The Comment Crew is behind 
many noteworthy attacks, including Opera-
tion Beebus, which targets U.S. aerospace 
and defense industries.21
One important characteristic of the Comment 
Crew—which puts it definitively in the catego-
ry of an advanced persistent threat, or APT—is 
that it is a bureaucracy. In-depth analysis 
reveals a small group of creative and strategic 
thinkers at the top. One layer down, a larger 
group of specialists design and produce 
malware in an industrial fashion. At the bottom 
are the foot soldiers—brute-force hackers who 
execute orders and wage extended cyber 
attack campaigns, from network reconnais-
sance to spear phishing to data exfiltration. 
The Comment Crew is so large, in fact, that 
when the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
(FBI) decoded one of the group’s stolen  
caches of information, if printed out, it would 
have created a stack of paper taller than a set 
of encyclopedias.22
Such a large bureaucracy helps to explain 
sometimes-incongruous cybercriminal behavior. 
A given piece of malware, for example, may have 
been written by an expert but incorrectly used 
later by an inexperienced foot soldier (such as a 
poorly written spear phishing email). Under-
standing this cyber attack life cycle and its 
different stages can help cyber defenders 
recognize and foil an attack. In any large organi-
zation, some processes are less mature than 
others, and therefore easier to recognize.
Chinese cyber defense
In its own defense, Chinese officials contend 
that their country is also a target of cyber 
attacks. In 2006, the China Aerospace Science & 
Industry Corporation (CASIC) found spyware on 
its classified network.23 In 2007, the Chinese 
Ministry of State Security stated that foreign 
cybercriminals were stealing Chinese informa-
tion, with 42 percent of attacks coming from 
Taiwan and 25 percent from the United States.24 
In 2009, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
announced that a cybercriminal from Taiwan had 
stolen his upcoming report to the National 
People’s Congress.25 In 2013, Edward Snowden, 
a former system administrator at the National 
Security Agency (NSA), published documents 
suggesting that the U.S. conducted cyber 
espionage against China;26 and the Chinese 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
stated that it possessed “mountains of data” on 
cyber attacks by the U.S.27
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North Korea—the upstart
North and South Korea remain locked in one of 
the most intractable conflicts on Earth. North 
Korea (supported by China) would seem to be 
stuck in a cyber Stone Age—especially relative 
to South Korea (supported by the U.S.)—has the 
fastest download speeds in the world28 and will 
issue its students with computer tablets 
instead of books by 2015.29 Even so, the 
Internet offers anyone, and any nation, an 
asymmetric way to gather intelligence and 
project national power in cyberspace—and 
North Korea appears to have acquired cyber 
attacks as a new weapon for its arsenal.
In 2009, North Korea launched its first major 
assault on South Korean and U.S. government 
websites. The attack did little damage, but the 
incident gained wide media exposure.30 By 
2013, however, the threat actors had matured. 
A group dubbed the “DarkSeoul Gang” was 
responsible for at least four years of high-pro-
file attacks on South Korea. The group’s 
attacks included a distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attack and malicious code that wiped 
computer hard drives at banks, media, ISPs, 
telcos, and financial services companies—over-
writing legitimate data with political messages. 
In the Korean conflict, such incidents often 
take place on dates of historical significance, 
including July 4, the U.S. Independence Day.31 
Suspected North Korean attacks on U.S. 
institutions include U.S. military elements 
based in South Korea, the U.S.-based Commit-
tee for Human Rights in North Korea, and even 
the White House.
North Korean defectors have described a burgeon-
ing cyberwarfare department of 3,000 personnel, 
largely trained in China and Russia. The defectors 
stressed that North Korea has a growing fascina-
tionwith cyber attacks as a cost-effective way to 
compete against its conventionally superior foes. 
They believe that North Korea is growing increas-
ingly comfortable and confident in this new warfare 
domain, assessing that the Internet is not only 
vulnerable to attack but that this strategy can 
create psychological pressure on the West. Toward 
this end, North Korea has focused on disconnecting 
its important servers from the Internet, while 
building a dedicated “attack network.”32
FireEye researchers have seen a heavy use of spear 
phishing and the construction of a “watering hole,” 
in which an important website is hacked in the hope 
of compromising the computers of its subsequent 
visitors, who usually belong to a certain VIP-profile 
the attacker is targeting. Some North Korean 
attacks have begun to manipulate a victim’s 
operating system settings and disable their 
anti-virus software—techniques that are normally 
characteristic of Russian cybercriminals. In other 
words, North Korean hackers may have learned 
from or have contracted support in Russia.
Apart from any possible disruption or destruction 
stemming from cyber attacks, computer network 
operations are an invaluable tool for collecting 
sensitive information, especially when it resides on 
government or think-tank networks normally 
inaccessible from the Internet. North Korea, 
China, and Russia are all naturally interested in 
collecting cyber intelligence that would increase 
their comparative advantage in classified informa-
tion, diplomatic negotiating positions, or future 
policy changes.
28 McDonald, M. (21 Feb 2011) “Home Internet May Get Even Faster in South Korea,” The New York Times.
29 Gobry, P-E. (5 JUL 2011) “South Korea Will Replace All Paper With Tablets In Schools By 2015,” Business Insider. 
30 Choe Sang-Hun, C. & Markoff, J. (8 Jul 2009) “Cyberattacks Jam Government and Commercial Web Sites in U.S. and South Korea,” The New York Times.
31 “Four Years of DarkSeoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on Anniversary of Korean War,” (27 Jun 2013) Symantec. 
32 Fisher, M. (20 March 2013) “South Korea under cyber attack: Is North Korea secretly awesome at hacking?” The Washington Post.
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At the same time, North Korea also asserts that it is a 
target of cyber attacks from South Korea and the U.S. 
In June 2013, when the North suffered a two-day 
outage of all of its in-country websites, its state news 
agency denounced “concentrated and persistent 
virus attacks,” and proclaimed that the U.S. and South 
Korea “will have to take the responsibility for the 
whole consequences.” The North noted that the 
attack took place in parallel with Key Resolve (joint 
U.S.-South Korean military exercises), but the  U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff denied any connection.33
India-Pakistan: old rivals, new tactics
A heavily fortified border separates India and 
Pakistan on the map. But the quiet, border-
less nature of cyberspace means both sides 
are free to engage in cyber warfare—even 
during peacetime.
In 2009, India announced that Pakistani cyber-
criminals had placed malware on popular Indian 
music download sites as a clever, indirect way to 
compromise Indian systems.34 In 2010, the 
“Pakistani Cyber Army” defaced and subsequent-
ly shut down the website of the Central Bureau 
of Investigation, India’s top police agency.35 In 
2012, over 100 Indian government websites 
were compromised.36
Not to be outdone, in 2013, cybercriminals in 
India undertook “Operation Hangover,” a large-
scale Indian cyber espionage campaign that hit 
Pakistani IT, mining, automotive, legal, engineer-
ing, food service, military, and financial services 
networks.37 Although researchers could not 
definitively tie the attacks to India’s government, 
many of the targets represented the country’s 
national security interests.38
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN): emerging economies as soft targets
Since at least 2010, many APTs (likely China-based) 
have targeted the governments, militaries, and 
businesses of ASEAN, the Southeast Asian 
geopolitical and economic group composed of 
Brunei,  Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. Although chances of any regional war 
erupting in the near term are low, a large volume of 
ongoing, regional cyber espionage activity is a 
constant. Targeted industries include telecommuni-
cations, transportation, oil and gas, banks, and think 
tanks. The usual motivation is to gain tactical or 
strategic advantage within the political, military, 
and economic domains.39
FireEye researchers are following numerous 
APT actors in this region, including BeeBus, 
Mirage, Check Command, Taidoor, Seinup, and 
Naikon. Their most common tactic is spear 
phishing, often using legitimate decoy docu-
ments that are related to the target’s national 
economy or politics, or to regional events such 
as ASEAN summits, Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summits, energy explora-
tion, or military affairs.
33 Herman, S. (15 Mar 2013) “North Korea Blames US, South for ‘Cyber Attack’,” Voice of America.
34 “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” Center for Strategic and International Studies.
35 “India and Pakistan in cyber war,” (4 Dec 2010) Al-Jazeera.
36 Muncaster, P. (16 March 2012) “Hackers hit 112 Indian gov sites in three months,” The Register.
37 “Operation Hangover: Q&A on Attacks,” (20 May 2013) Symantec.
38 “Snorre Fagerland, et al. “Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian Cyberattack Infrastructure.” May 2013. 
39 Finkle, J. (4 Aug 2011) “’State actor’ behind slew of cyber attacks,” Reuters.
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FireEye believes that many of these regional 
economic organizations are attractive targets for 
APT campaigns because the information they 
possess is valuable and their level of cyber security 
awareness is low. Often, these organizations have 
inconsistent system administration, infrequent 
software patch management, poor policy control, or 
some combination of these issues. Thus, many of 
these networks are “low-hanging fruit” for attackers. 
And to make matters worse, compromised systems 
are used as staging grounds for further attacks on 
regional targets, by installing illicit com-
mand-and-control (CnC) servers, abusing legitimate 
email accounts, and disseminating stolen office 
documents as “bait.”
Russia/Eastern Europe
Russia—a little bit “too quiet?”
In 1939, Winston Churchill declared that Russia 
was a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma …”. Seven decades later, cyber defense 
researchers would say that not much has 
changed. Compared with the constant attacks 
detected from China, you can almost hear the 
snow falling on Red Square. One of the outstand-
ing questions in cyber security today is: Where 
are the Russians? Perhaps they are simply great 
hackers. Maybe they have sufficient human 
intelligence. Whatever the reason, cyber defense 
analysts often look in vain for the traces of 
Russian cybercriminals. As a step toward finding 
some answers, however, consider the second half 
of Churchill’s quote: “… but perhaps there is a 
key—that key is Russian national interest.”40 In 
other words, where there is smoke, there is 
usually fire.
In the mid-1990s, at the very dawn of the World 
Wide Web, Russia was engaged in a protracted 
struggle over the fate of Chechnya; the Chechens 
became pioneers in cyber propaganda, and the 
Russians became pioneers is shutting down their 
websites. In 1998, when Russian ally Serbia was 
under attack from NATO, pro-Serbian hackers 
jumped in the fray, targeting NATO with DoS 
attacks and at least twenty-five strains of 
virus-infected email. In 2007, Russia was the 
prime suspect in the most famous international 
cyber attack to date—the punitive DDoS on 
Estonia for moving a Soviet-era statue.41  
In 2008, researchers uncovered clear evidence 
that computer network operations played a 
supporting role in Russian military advances 
during its invasion of Georgia.42 Also in 2008, 
Russia was suspected in what U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense William Lynn called the 
“most significant breach of U.S. military 
computers ever”—an attack on Central Com-
mand (CENTCOM), delivered through an 
infected USB drive.43 In 2009, Russian cyber-
criminals were blamed in “Climategate,” a 
breach of university research intended to 
undermine international negotiations on climate 
change mitigation.44 In 2010, NATO and the 
European Union warned of increased Russian 
cyber attacks, while the FBI arrested and 
deported a possible Russian intelligence agent 
named Alexey Karetnikov, who had been 
working as a software  tester at Microsoft.45
40 “Winston Churchill,” Wikiquote.
41 Geers K. (2008) “Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare,” Hakin9 E-Book, 19(3) No. 6; SC Magazine (27 AUG 08) 1-12. 
42 “Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign against Georgia in August of 2008,” (Aug 2009) U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit. 
43 Lynn, W.J. (2010) “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs 89(5) 97-108.
44 Stewart, W. & Delgado, M. (6 Dec 2009) “Were Russian security services behind the leak of ‘Climategate’ emails?” Daily Mail & “Global warning: New 
Climategate leaks,” (23 Nov 2011) RT.
45 Ustinova, A. (14 Jul 2010) “Microsoft Says 12th Alleged Russian Spy Was Employee,” Bloomberg.
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One ironic aspect of nation-state cyber attacks—
especially in authoritarian countries—is that many  
of them are inward facing. In 2012, Russian security 
firm Kaspersky Lab announced the discovery of 
“Red October,”46 a cyber attack campaign that spied 
on millions of citizens around the world, but chiefly 
within the former Soviet Union. Targets included 
embassies, research firms, military bases, energy 
providers, nuclear agencies, and critical 
infrastructure.47 Similarly, in 2013, researchers 
found malware on millions of Android devices in 
Russia and in Russian-speaking countries. Either or 
both of these attacks could be partially explained as 
the Russian government keeping an eye on its own 
population, and that of neighboring countries.48
On the brighter side, as a step toward cyber 
détente, the U.S. and Russia in 2013 signed 
an agreement to build a cyber “hotline”—
similar to that used for nuclear scares during 
the Cold War—to help defuse any computer-
related crises in the future.49 But, just to be 
on the safe side, Russia is taking the extreme 
cyber defense measure of buying old-
fashioned typewriters,50 and the Russian 
military is (like the U.S., China, and Israel) 
creating cyber warfare-focused units.51
Russian tactics
Though relatively quiet, Russia appears to 
be home to many of the most complex and 
advanced  cyber attacks FireEye researchers 
have seen. More specifically, Russian exploit 
code can be significantly stealthier than its 
Chinese counterpart—which can also make it 
more worrisome. The “Red October” 
campaign, including its satellite software 
dubbed “Sputnik,” is a prominent example of 
likely  Russian malware.
TTP often includes the delivery of 
weaponized email attachments, though 
Russian cybercriminals appear to be adept 
at changing their attack patterns, exploits, 
and data exfiltration methods to evade 
detection. In fact, one telltale aspect of 
Russian hackers seems to be that, unlike the 
Chinese, they go to extraordinary lengths to 
hide their identities and objectives. FireEye 
analysts have even  seen examples in which 
they have run “false-flag” cyber operations, 
designing their attack to appear  as if it came 
from Asia.
46 “The ‘Red October’ Campaign—An Advanced Cyber Espionage Network Targeting Diplomatic and Government Agencies” (14 Jan 2013)   
GReAT, Kaspersky Lab.
47 Lee, D. (14 Jan 2013) “’Red October’” cyber-attack found by Russian researchers,” BBC News
48 Jackson Higgins, K. (3 Aug 2013) “Anatomy of a Russian Cybercrime Ecosystem Targeting Android,” Dark Reading. 
49 Gallagher, S. (18 Jun 2013) “US, Russia to install ‘cyber-hotline’ to prevent accidental cyberwar,” Ars Technica.
50 Ingersoll, G. (11 Jul 2013) “Russia Turns to Typewriters to Protect against Cyber Espionage,” Business Insider.
51 Gorshenin, V. (29 Aug 2013) “Russia to create cyber-warfare units,” Pravda
.
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One further problem for cyber defense 
researchers is that some Russian back doors into 
compromised systems are hard to distinguish 
from advanced cybercriminal break-ins.
Middle East
As a region, the Middle East may not possess the 
arsenal of zero-day exploits available in Russia, or 
the brute-force numbers of China. Therefore, 
some Middle Eastern hackers may have to rely on 
cyber tactics that emphasize novelty, creativity, 
and deception. 
For example, the 2012 Mahdi campaign, which 
infected targets in the Middle East, used 
malicious Word documents, PowerPoint files, 
and PDFs to infect targets. That approach is 
similar to many other attackers. But these 
attacks were accompanied by some imaginative 
elements such as games, attractive images, and 
custom animations specifically designed to aid 
in the attack. 
Not only did they trick users into executing 
commands to install malicious code, but they 
also distracted users from seeing malware-
related warning messages. Furthermore, 
Mahdi attacks were tailored to specific target 
audiences—for example by offering variations 
of games unique to each organization. Such 
pinpoint strikes rely on prior reconnaissance, 
help to evade cyber defense behavioral-
detection mechanisms, and dramatically 
increase the odds of compromise. So in the 
Middle East, the relative sophistication of an 
attack may be calculated less in the 
technology, and more in the clever ways in 
which malware is delivered and installed on a 
target network.
Reconnaissance Likely HUMINT Sources
Weaponization Malicious DOC/XLS File Formats
Delivery Weaponized Email Attachments
Exploitation 0-Day Application Vulnerabilities
Installation Feature Rich RAT with Encrypted Modules
Command and  
Control (C2)
HTTP with Custom Embedded E 
ncoding / Encryption
Actions on Objectives Intelligence Gathering (Govt. Focused)
TTP Exemplars Red October
Table 2: Characteristics of Russian cyber attacks
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Iran: a “hot” cyber war
Wherever significant activity erupts in the real 
world (including crime, espionage, and war-
fare), parallel activity unfolds in cyberspace. It 
is therefore unsurprising that Iran—which has 
tense international relations and is on the 
verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb—has also 
experienced the most sophisticated cyber 
attacks to date.
In 2010, Stuxnet was a “cyber missile” of sorts 
designed with painstaking precision to burrow 
deep  into Iran’s nuclear program and destroy 
physical infrastructure. To some degree, this 
piece of software replaced a squadron of fighter 
aircraft that would have violated foreign 
airspace, dropped laser-guided bombs, and left 
a smoking crater in the Earth’s surface.52 
Beyond Stuxnet, other advanced espionage 
attacks have worried security experts, including 
Duqu, Flame, and Gauss, which all may have 
come from the same threat actor.53 And even 
amateurs are successfully targeting Iran; 
although the “Mahdi” malware is by comparison 
far less sophisticated than Stuxnet and its 
cousins, Mahdi has still managed to compromise 
engineering firms, government agencies, 
financial services firms, and academia through-
out the Middle East.54.
Table 3: Characteristics of  Middle Eastern cyber attacks
52 Sanger, D. Confront and Conceal. (New York: 2012) pp. 188-225.
53 Boldizsár Bencsáth. “Duqu, Flame, Gauss: Followers of Stuxnet,” BME CrySyS Lab, RSA 2012. 
54 Simonite, T. (31 Aug 2012) “Bungling Cyber Spy Stalks Iran,” MIT Technology Review.
Reconnaissance Regional Mailing Lists, Conferences
Weaponization Malicious PPT/PPS Files
Delivery Weaponized Email Attachments
Exploitation Social Engineering Mouse Clicks on Screen
Installation
Primitive Collection of Custom Tools / RAT 
(Requires Operator For Lateral Movement)
Command and  
Control (C2)
Plain HTTP; Hiding in Plain Sight
Actions on Objectives
Intelligence Gathering (Middle East Focused), 
Denial of Service
TTP Exemplars Madi, LV
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So how does anyone, including a nation-state, 
respond to a cyber attack? Does the counter-
strike remain within the cyber realm, or can it 
come in the form of a traditional military (or 
terrorist) assault? In 2012, Iran appears to have 
chosen the first option. A hacker group called the 
“Cutting Sword of Justice” used the “Shamoon” 
virus to attack the Saudi Arabian national oil 
company Aramco, deleting data on three-quar-
ters of Aramco’s corporate PCs (including 
documents, spreadsheets, e-mails, and files) and 
replacing them with an image of a burning 
American flag.55 And over the past year, another 
group called Izz ad-Din al-Qassam launched 
“Operation Ababil,” a series of DDoS attacks 
against many U.S. financial institutions including 
the New York Stock Exchange.56
Other examples of cyber attacks abound. In 
2009, the plans for a new U.S. Marine Corps 1 
presidential helicopter were found on a 
file-sharing network in Iran.57 In 2010, the 
“Iranian Cyber Army” disrupted Twitter and the 
Chinese search engine Baidu, redirecting users 
to Iranian political messages.58 In 2011, Iranian 
attackers compromised a Dutch digital certifi-
cate authority, after which it issued more than 
500 fraudulent certificates for major compa-
nies and government agencies.59 In 2012, Iran 
disrupted the BBC’s Persian Language Service, 
and University of Toronto researchers reported 
that some versions of the Simurgh “proxy” 
software (which is popular in countries like Iran 
and anonymizes Internet traffic) also installed a 
Trojan that collected usernames and key-
strokes, sending them to a likely intelligence 
collection site.60 Finally, in 2013 the Wall Street 
Journal reported that Iranian actors had 
increased their efforts to compromise U.S. 
critical infrastructure.61
Syria: what is the Syrian Electronic Army?
Syria is in the midst of a civil war, so researchers 
have a lot of cyber activity to analyze. The most 
prominent hacker group by far is the Syrian 
Electronic Army (SEA), which is loyal to Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad. SEA has conducted 
DDoS attacks, phishing, pro-Assad defacements, 
and spamming campaigns against governments, 
online services, and media that are perceived to 
be hostile to  the Syrian government. SEA has 
hacked Al-Jazeera, Anonymous, Associated 
Press (AP), BBC, Daily Telegraph, Financial 
Times, Guardian, Human Rights Watch, National 
Public Radio, The New York Times, Twitter, and 
more.62 Its most famous exploit was a hoax 
announcement using AP’s Twitter account that 
the White House was bombed and President 
Obama injured—after which stock markets 
briefly dipped to the tune of $200 billion.63.
55 Perlroth, N. (23 Oct 2012) “In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran Firing Back,” The New York Times.
56 Walker, D. (8 Mar 2013) “Hacktivists plan to resume DDoS campaign against U.S. banks,” SC Magazine.
57 Borak, D. (3 Mar 2009) “Source in Iran views Marine One blueprints,” Marine Corps Times.
58 Wai-yin Kwok, V. (13 Jan 2010) “Baidu Hijacked By Cyber Army,” Forbes.
59 Charette, R. (9 Sep 2011) “DigiNotar Certificate Authority Breach Crashes e-Government in the Netherlands,” IEEE Spectrum. 
60 “Iranian anti-censorship software ‘Simurgh’ circulated with malicious backdoor,” (25 May 2012) Citizenlab.
61 Gorman, S. & Yadron, D. (23 May 2013) “Iran Hacks Energy Firms, U.S. Says,” Wall Street Journal.
62 Fisher, M. & Keller, J. (31 Aug 2011) “Syria’s Digital Counter-Revolutionaries.” The Atlantic; “Syrian Electronic Army,”  (accessed 25 July, 2013) Wikipedia.
63 Manzoor, S. (25 July, 2013) “Slaves to the algorithm: Are stock market math geniuses, or quants, a force for good?” The Sunday Telegraph.
17  www.fireeye.com
World War C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Today’s Advanced Cyber Attacks
In the month of July 2013 alone, SEA compro-
mised three widely used online communications 
websites: Truecaller (the world’s largest tele-
phone directory),64 Tango (a video and text 
messaging service),65 and Viber (a free online 
calling and messaging application).66 These types 
of compromises are significant because they can 
give Syrian intelligence access to the communica-
tions of millions of people, including political 
activists within Syria who might then be targeted 
for espionage, intimidation, and arrest.
To compromise its targets, the SEA often sends 
socially engineered, spear-phishing emails to 
lure opposition activists into opening fraudulent, 
weaponized, and malicious documents. If the 
recipient falls for the scam, Trojan horse, remote 
access tool (RAT) software is installed on the 
victim’s computer that can give the attacker 
keystrokes, screenshots, microphone and 
webcam recordings, stolen documents, and 
passwords. And of course, the SEA likely sends 
all of this information to a computer address 
lying within Syrian government-controlled 
Internet Protocol (IP) space for intelligence 
collection and review.67
Israel: old conflict, new tactics
Even during the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict saw many hot wars, and it was often the 
testing ground for new military weapons and 
tactics. Nothing has changed in the Internet era. 
Since at least 2000, pro-Israeli hackers have 
targeted sites of political and military signifi-
cance in the Middle East.68 In 2007, Israel 
reportedly disrupted Syrian air defense networks 
via cyber attack (with some collateral damage to 
its own domestic networks) to facilitate the 
Israeli Air Force’s destruction of an alleged  
Syrian nuclear facility.69
64 Khare, A. (19 July 2013) “Syrian Electronic Army Hacks Truecaller Database, Gains Access Codes to Social Media Accounts.” iDigital Times. 
65 Kastrenakes, J. (22 July 2013) “Syrian Electronic Army alleges stealing ‘millions’ of phone numbers from chat app Tango.”  The Verge; Albanesius, C. (23 July 
2013) “Tango Messaging App Targeted by Syrian Electronic Army.” PCMag.
66 Ashford, W. (24 July 2013) “Syrian hacktvists hit second mobile app in a week.” Computer Weekly.
67 Tsukayama, H. (28 Aug 2013) “Attacks like the one against the New York Times should put consumers on alert,” The Washington Post. 
68 Geers K. (2008) “Cyberspace and the Changing Nature of Warfare,” Hakin9 E-Book, 19(3) No. 6; SC Magazine (27 AUG 08) 1-12.
69 Carroll, W. (26 Nov 2007) “Israel’s Cyber Shot at Syria,” Defense Tech.
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But as an advanced industrial nation, Israel also 
depends on information technology. The nation 
has proven to be vulnerable to cyber attacks, 
which often target the Israeli economy. In 
2009, during Israel’s military operation in Gaza, 
hackers briefly paralyzed many government 
sites with a DDoS attack from at least 500,000 
computers. The 2009 attack consisted of four 
independent waves, each stronger than the 
last, peaking at 15 million junk mail deliveries 
per second. The Israeli “Home Front Command” 
website, which plays a key role in national 
defense communications with the public, was 
down for three hours. Due to technical 
similarities with the 2008 cyber attack on 
Georgia during its war with Russia, Israeli 
officials surmised that the attack itself might 
have been carried out by a criminal organiza-
tion in the former Soviet Union, and paid for by 
Hamas or Hezbollah.70
Often, the trouble with cyber attacks is that 
they do not need to be highly sophisticated to 
succeed, even against security-conscious Israel. 
In 2012, the ineptly written71 “Mahdi” malware 
compromised at least 54 targets in Israel.72 Last 
but not least, in 2013, the Iranian media 
reported that the Syrian army had carried out a 
cyber attack against the water supply of the 
Israeli city of Haifa. Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel, a 
cyber security adviser to Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu, said that the report was 
false, but added that cyber attacks on critical 
infrastructures pose a “real and present threat” 
to Israel.73
The West
United States
Analysts believe that the U.S. has conducted the 
most highly engineered cyber attacks to date, 
including Stuxnet,74 Duqu, Flame, and Gauss.75 
This family of malware is unparalleled in its 
complexity and targeting. Stuxnet in particular 
was developed with a singular goal (to disrupt 
Iranian nuclear enrichment) that was both 
narrowly focused and capable of yielding strategic 
gains in the international arena. In contrast to 
computer worms such as Slammer and Code Red, 
Stuxnet did not seek to compromise as many 
computers as possible, but as few as possible. 
Even more amazing, its malicious behavior was 
concealed under a veneer of apparently legitimate 
operational data—but ultimately,  the malware 
destroyed Iranian centrifuges.
This family of malware was exquisitely designed. 
For example, its payload can arrive at its destina-
tion encrypted—and become decrypted and 
installed only on a target device. This helps the 
malware to evade the prying eyes of cyber defend-
ers, making discovering and reverse engineering 
the malware much more difficult.
Ironically, this family of malware could be a 
paragon of over-engineering. For example, it not 
only uses multiple zero-day exploits, but also 
world-first computational achievements such as a 
70 Pfeffer, A. (15 Jun 2009) “Israel suffered massive cyber attack during Gaza offensive,” Haaretz.
71 Simonite, T. (31 Aug 2012) “Bungling Cyber Spy Stalks Iran,” MIT Technology Review.
72 Zetter, K. (17 Jul 2012) “Mahdi, the Messiah, Found Infecting Systems in Iran, Israel,” WIRED.
73 Yagna, Y. (26 May 2013) “Ex-General denies statements regarding Syrian cyber attack,” Haaretz.
74 Sanger, D. Confront and Conceal. (New York: 2012) pp. 188-225.
75 Boldizsár Bencsáth. “Duqu, Flame, Gauss: Followers of Stuxnet,” BME CrySyS Lab, RSA 2012.
76 Goodin, Dan (7 Jun 2012) “Crypto breakthrough shows Flame was designed by world-class scientists,” Ars Technica.
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forced cryptographic “hash collision.”76 In the 
case of Iran (which is currently subject to a trade 
embargo that restricts its acquisition of high tech-
nology), it is doubtful whether Iranian software is 
up-to-date or properly configured. So the authors 
of Stuxnet could likely have used more conven-
tional computer exploits and still succeeded.
One possible telling aspect of U.S. cyber attacks: 
they require such a high level of financial 
investment, technical sophistication, and legal 
oversight that they will stand out from the crowd. 
On the last point, Richard Clarke, who served 
three U.S. Presidents as a senior counterterrorism 
official, argued that Stuxnet was a U.S. operation 
because “it very much had the feel to it of having 
been written by or governed by a team of 
Washington lawyers.”77 Finally, the amount of 
work involved in these operations suggests the 
participation of an enormous defense 
contractor base, with different companies 
specializing in particular aspects of a large and 
complex undertaking.
On the downside (and similar to the Israeli case), 
all advanced industrial economies are vulnerable  
to cyber counterattack. In 2008, a CIA official 
informed a conference of critical infrastructure 
providers that unknown cybercriminals, on 
multiple occasions, had been able to disrupt the 
power supply in various foreign cities.78 In the 
military domain, Iraqi insurgents used $26 
off-the-shelf software to intercept live video feeds 
from U.S. Predator drones, likely giving them the 
ability to monitor and evade U.S. military 
operations.79 In the economic sphere, the U.S.-
based International Monetary Fund (IMF) fell 
victim to a phishing attack in 2011 that was 
described as a “very major breach.”80
Thus, while cyber attacks are relatively a new 
phenomenon, they represent a growing national 
security challenge. As part of a broader effort to 
mitigate the threat, President Obama signed a 
directive in 2013 that the U.S. should aid allies 
who come under foreign cyber attack.81
77 Rosenbaum, R. (Apr 2012) “Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack,” Smithsonian.
78 Nakashima, E. & Mufson, S. (19 Jan 2008) “Hackers Have Attacked Foreign Utilities, CIA Analyst Says,” Washington Post. 
79 Gorman, S., Dreazen, Y. & Cole, A. (17 Dec 2009) “Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones,” Wall Street Journal.
80 Sanger, D. & Markoff, J. (11 Jun 2011) “I.M.F. Reports Cyberattack Led to ‘Very Major Breach’,” New York Times.
81 Shanker, T. & Sanger, D. (8 Jun 2013) “U.S. Helps Allies Trying to Battle Iranian Hackers,” New York Times.
Table 4: Characteristics  of Western cyber attacks
Reconnaissance Likely HUMINT Sources
Weaponization Auto Infected Removable Media
Delivery USB Removable Media
Exploitation Social Engineering USB Media Use
Installation
Well-Crafted, Targeted (Crypto-Keyed) Worm 
(No Operator Required; Auto-Lateral Movement)
Command and  
Control (C2)
Strategic One-Time Use C2 Nodes;  
Full SSL Crypto
Actions on Objectives
Intelligence Gathering / Subtle System 
Disruption (Middle East Focused)
TTP Exemplars Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, Gauss
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Europe
No prominent examples have been 
discovered of the European Union (EU) or the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
conducting their own offensive cyber attacks. 
On the contrary, their leaders have so far 
foresworn them.82 But many examples reveal 
European networks getting hacked from 
other parts of the world, particularly China 
and Russia.
Within government, cyber attacks on the 
British Foreign Ministry evaded network 
defenses in 2010 by pretending to come from 
the White House.83 In 2011, German Police 
found that servers used to locate serious 
criminals and terrorism suspects had been 
penetrated, initially via a phishing attack.84 Also 
in 2011, European Commission officials were 
targeted at an Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF) in Azerbaijan.85
In the military sphere, in 2009, French Navy 
planes were grounded following an infection by 
the Conficker worm.86 In 2012, the UK admitted 
that cybercriminals had penetrated its classified 
Ministry of Defense networks.87
In business, the European Union’s carbon trading 
market was breached in 2011, resulting in the theft 
of more than $7 million in credits, forcing the 
market to shut down temporarily.88 In 2012, the 
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 
(EADS) and German steelmaker ThyssenKrupp fell 
victim to major attacks by Chinese cybercriminals.89
Security professionals should particularly be on the 
lookout for APT cyber threats just before and 
during international negotiations. In 2011 alone, 
the European Commission complained of wide-
spread hacking before an EU summit,90 the French 
government was compromised prior to a G-20 
meeting,91 and at least 10 Norwegian defense and 
energy companies were breached during large-
scale contract negotiations, via phishing that was 
specifically tailored to each company.92
82 Leyden, J. (6 June 2012) “Relax hackers! NATO has no cyber-attack plans—top brass,” The Register.
83 Arthur, C. (5 Feb 2011) “William Hague reveals hacker attack on Foreign Office in call for cyber rules,” The Observer.
84 “Hackers infiltrate German police and customs service computers,” (18 July 2011) Infosecurity Magazine.
85 Satter, R. (10 Nov 2012) “European Commission Officials Hacked At Internet Governance Forum,” Huffington Post.
86 Willsher, K. (7 Feb 2009) “French fighter planes grounded by computer virus,” The Telegraph.
87 Hopkins, N. (3 May 2012) “Hackers have breached top secret MoD systems, cyber-security chief admits,” The Guardian.
88 Krukowska, E. & Carr, M. (20 Jan 2011), “EU Carbon Trading Declines After Alleged Hacking Suspends Spot Market,” Bloomberg. 
89 Rochford, O. (24 Feb 2013) “European Space, Industrial Firms Breached in Cyber Attacks: Report,” Security Week.
90 “’Serious’ cyber attack on EU bodies before summit,” (23 Mar 2011) BBC.
91 Charette, R. (8 Mar 2011) “’Spectacular’ Cyber Attack Gains Access to France’s G20 Files,” IEEE Spectrum.
92 Albanesius, C. (18 Nov 2011) “Norway Cyber Attack Targets Country’s Oil, Gas Systems,” PCMag.
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Conclusion
World War Z told a story of idiosyncratic 
national behavior in response to a major 
international crisis.  This report sought to 
highlight the same phenomenon in regard to the 
challenges posed by national cyber insecurity 
and international cyber attacks. Behind every 
incident is an agenda—and individual human 
beings—each unique and ultimately identifiable. 
The bigger the cyber campaign, the more data it 
generates for security researchers, and the more 
difficulty attackers will have remaining anony-
mous and hiding their agenda.
As for crystal balls: no one knows what the next 
cyber attack will look like. But considering recent 
trends, we can make a few educated guesses.  
Here are five factors that could change the 
world’s cyber security landscape in the near- to 
medium-term:
1. Outage of national critical infrastructure: 
we know that cyber attacks can disrupt 
government networks, but most current cases 
simply do not rise to the level of a national 
security threat. Stuxnet—and Iran’s alleged 
retaliation against Saudi Aramco—has shifted 
the thinking on cyber war from theory to 
something closer to reality. But have we seen 
the limit of what cyber attacks can achieve, or 
could cybercriminals threaten public safety by 
downing a power grid or financial market?
2. Cyber arms treaty: if world leaders begin to 
view cyber attacks as more of a liability than 
an opportunity, they may join a cyber arms 
control regime or sign a non-aggression pact 
for cyberspace. However, arms control 
requires the ability to inspect for a prohibited 
item. President Reagan’s favorite Russian 
proverb was доверяй, но проверяй, or 
“trust but verify.” Given that a single USB 
stick can now hold billions of bits of informa-
tion, verifying would be easier said than done.
3. PRISM, freedom of speech, and privacy: we 
are still at the dawn of the Internet era, and 
this conversation has only just begun. It 
encompasses Daniel Ellsberg, Chelsea 
Manning, and Edward Snowden, as well as 
the Declaration of Independence, Enigma, 
and The Onion Router (TOR). Today, 
politicians, spooks, and hippies are all aware 
of a critical debate on the horizon—just how 
much online privacy should we have?
4. New actors on the cyber stage: the 
revolutionary nature of computers and the 
amplification power of networks are not 
exclusive to the world’s largest nations. Iran, 
Syria, North Korea, and even non-state 
actors such as Anonymous have employed 
cyber attacks as a way to conduct diplomacy 
and wage war by other means. Researchers 
have little reason to think that other 
governments are not active in this domain. 
Possible candidates could be: 
 
a. Poland: it was the Poles who first broke 
the German Enigma cipher—way back in 
1932!Today, with programming talent and 
well-known rivalry with Russia, it is a 
possibility. 
 
b. Brazil: Home to some of the world’s most 
prolific cybercriminals, will Brazil’s govern-
ment, be angry about recent revelations of 
U.S. cyber spying, harness this talent for 
geopolitical ends? 
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c.  Taiwan: with constant cyber attacks 
emanating from Mainland China, Taipei may 
have little choice but to react.
5. Stronger focus on evasion: as we have 
seen, some nation-states know how to 
launch stealthy cyber attacks. But as the 
discipline of cyber defense matures, and 
as public awareness of the World War C 
phenomenon grows, some “noisy” cyber 
attackers such as China may be forced to 
raise their game by trying to fly under a 
more finely tuned radar.
The analysis and conclusions drawn in this paper are 
conjectural. Cyber security, cyber espionage, and 
cyber war are new and rapidly evolving concepts. 
Furthermore, most computer network operations 
are shrouded in secrecy. Deception is a given. 
“A cyber attack, viewed outside of its geopolitical 
context, allows very little legal maneuvering room  
for the defending state,” said Prof. Thomas 
Wingfield of the Marshall Center, in a recent email 
interview with FireEye. “False flag operations and 
the very nature of the Internet make tactical 
attribution a losing game.”
But Wingfield adds that strategic attribution—fus-
ing all sources of intelligence on a potential 
threat—allows a much higher level of confidence 
and more options for government decision 
makers. “And strategic attribution begins and 
ends with geopolitical analysis,” he said. With this 
in mind, we hope that an awareness of this World 
War C dynamic helps cyber security profession-
als better understand, identify, and combat cyber 
attacks in the future.
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an attack life cycle. The core of the FireEye 
platform is a virtual execution engine, comple-
mented by dynamic threat intelligence, to 
identify and block cyber attacks in real time. 
FireEye has over 1,100 customers across 
more than 40 countries, including over 100 of 
the Fortune 500. 
For more information on next-generation threat 
protection, visit www.FireEye.com.
